144 changes occurred; the ethnic character of the Barundi changes only slightly, in spite of the fact also that political connections with the Mountain Barundi had become much less close.

691 [12] In 1901 Richard Kandt wrote as follows of the Barundi of the Tanganyika lowlands.

"Politically the area between the eastern periphery of the Central African graben and the Ruzizi is divided into from ten to twelve rather small sultanates, most of which probably cover approximately 150 to 200 square kilometers. They are nominally not independent; their rulers, who all belong to the Semitic Watussi of the Galla territories south of Abyssinia, were originally vassals of the king of Urundi, or the 'Muesi' as he is called by title. But although the majority of the inhabitants gives the impression of being almost pure Warundi, the high crest of the peripheral mountains and the broad desolate primeval forest were too convenient a bulwark not to arouse the desire of independence in the population which is hardly affected by grandiose ideas of national unity, the more so since the mother country is also split up into a large number of mutually warring chiefdoms which are only loosely bound to the central power. The only existing remnant of cohesion seems to be the fact that the Muesi has some kind of religious importance which makes his chief think it advisable not to sever all connections with him.

● 182 If we consider how infinitely different the entire living conditions of the Lake Warundi dwelling near Tanganyika are from those of the Mountain Warundi and how far back the various influences go which affect the Lake Warundi (namely, the presence of the Wasuaheli [Swahili], the Arabs, and the various western tribes following in their footsteps), we are surprised at how stubbornly they have nevertheless remained true in the matter of their external appearance, language, and customs to the peculiarities of their unusually isolated native country. The same is true of the Warundi living in the low valley of the Ruzizi, except that for them the temptation to abandon the customs of their forefathers was considerably smaller, and the farther north they lived, the smaller it became." (No. 22, pp. 339-340.)

231 the last herds of the long-horned cattle in the Urundi border villages west of the Kisuma River; east of this, in lower northern Uha, the bush forest and tsetse fly begin.

In Urundi and Ruanda there are none of the smaller, short-horned zebu or humped cattle that are found in the rest of East Africa. Bahima cattle are so well adjusted to the climate and the mode of life of the highlands of the interlacustrine region that they thrive only in this region. As soon as the animals are taken to the lower areas, that is, to Unjamwesi, Lake Victoria, or to the coastal regions, they languish and soon die, even if they are not stung by the tsetse fly. In this respect they are quite like the Batussi themselves with whom they live in a kind of symbiosis.

As a former nation of shepherds, the Batussi place a high value on their cattle which is quite foreign to the Bantu. It far exceeds the estimate of their capital value. Cattle are not regarded as producers of meat, as an "article of consumption," but as original capital from which only the dividends (milk, [237] butter, blood tapped from the living animal, hair) may be used, while the capital itself (individual heads of cattle) may only be exchanged for other valuable capital assets, for example, women. More than that, cattle have a high sentimental value for the [182] Mutussi. His entire thoughts and aspirations revolve around the cattle; they are for him the mainstay of his social order, yes, even the object of his devotion which in many cases even transcends into the religious sphere. Accordingly, they are objects of a cult which is full of symbols and mystical relationships. [776] The highest deity, Imana, is first of all protector of the cattle. In East Africa we find a similar attitude among the Hamito-Nilotic nation of herdsmen, the Massai. In whatever concerns cattle, a woman has no say at all. The entire breeding and [462] care of the cattle, even milking, is the job of the man. It is true that in this sphere too the Bahutu have to do all the heavy work, cleaning the animals, tending the cattle in the pasture, milking the cows, etc., but the Mutussi does the more delicate work: he chooses the animals for breeding; he is the veterinarian; he decides what animals are to be killed or sacrificed; and he does this job with all the affection of the sportsman for his animal.

614 Wherever monarchy with its state organization has not yet
621 dissolved the clans and dispersed their members all over the various feudal districts of the Batussi state (see p. 89), wherever the clans have preserved the main elements of their ancient solidarity and autonomy, as is the case particularly in the more or less independent border provinces of Urundi (and Ruanda), the clans form small or large communities under an elected clan elder (umugabo). This is especially true of
614 the Bahutu clans that existed in the area before the period of
423 Batussi rule. The office of the umugabo is hereditary in
621 many cases. The central communalistic element in the organization of these clans is the communal ownership of the land occupied by the clan. The land belongs to the clan community probably because it was originally appropriated and cultivated by the clan. The individual clan members is merely entitled to the use of the land he cultivates or of the pasture where his cattle grazes. Only the hut built on this ground is the real property of the individual, in addition to the inventory of implements, tools, weapons, and the cattle he has raised from the herd with which he has been vested by his feudal lord (see p. 93).

614 E. Johanssen, a missionary who in 1907 founded the first
●182 Protestant missionary stations of Dsinga and Kirinda in Ruanda
[114] and who is an eminent student of the Banjaruanda, makes the following comment on the social importance of the Ruanda clans: "These kin group organizations hand down the old customs and traditions from one generation to the next. In this way they preserve the national characteristics against intermixture and decay. The easier it is to loosen the ties of the family group in its narrowly defined sense as a result of polygamy and by the dissolution of marriage, the greater is the [105] importance of the stable, indissoluble, religiously determined kin group. The destruction of this group would cause the entire nation to disintegrate and to split up into isolated groups which would be exposed to any outside influence. There can be no doubt that the kin group, as the

614 vehicle of tradition and religious customs (totem, food taboos,
182 sacrificial community), has been of great importance in sustaining the nation's life." (No. 39, p. 73.) This characterization also applies to the clans of the Barundi.

However, the Batussi monarchy is a most powerful enemy
614 of the clan organization. The growing power of the Batussi kings
642 has laid claim, as has been shown above, to all the land and
182 cattle as the personal property of the king who parcels it out in larger or smaller portions as fiefs to his Batussi followers (see p. 89). The king's vassal, in turn, divides his fief into smaller portions with which he vests his people. The former clan elder is usually appointed mutwale of the king and collects the taxes and other tribute of which he retains a share. Under the conquering kings the clan has thus been disrupted socially and economically and has been rather quickly absorbed into the political feudal community of the state, although it may still retain its clan name, its old customs, some of its institutions, and its totem for a long time to come.

There is one element of the old clan organization which
642 the clan members have retained even under the political re-
614 organization of the Batussi monarchy since it offers them a
628 strong protection against arbitrary acts of their rulers: it is
182 the vendetta (kuhora). Originally, allied clans used it as the most effective way to protect themselves when they were threatened by other clans. Even at the present time the vendetta is the strongest bulwark for the protection of the individual in spite of the fact that public and private security has considerably increased under the strong rule of the royal batwale. Despite criminal jurisdiction administered by the batwale, the vendetta is still used by the clan members as the most effective form of self-help and as a protective instrument of intimidation on the part of those who are politically weak. A person who kills or injures a member of a clan is killed or wounded by the members of the wronged clan (see p. 97). If the wrongdoer cannot be apprehended, the vendetta will strike another member of the criminal's clan. Indeed, more than that, some clans

642 may not be satisfied by equal retribution but avenge the loss
614 of one of their members by killing two or more members of the
628 opposite clan. In former times this created a permanent state
182 of war within the nation, no large-scale political community could develop, and the resistance of the Barundi against external aggression was extremely weakened. The same was true of Ruanda (No. 48, p. 238). It was only the strong monarchy of the Batussi which, in its own interest, put an end to this permanent civil guerrilla warfare. However, now the clans use the vendetta for the protection of their members under the cover of secrecy. The former open guerrilla warfare has turned into insidious murder against which even the most powerful Batussi mutwale is not secure if he is guilty of bloody acts of violence against some clan. The effect of this avenging popular justice and the manner in which it is regarded by the people are reminiscent of our Vehmgericht of medieval times, although they are both quite different in other respects.

[106] Chapter 8

Marriage, Birth, Death

1. Contracting Marriage, Wife, Children

582 In most cases the Barundi are married (kurongora) at quite an early age: the men as soon as they can pay the bride price; the girls often at the age of twelve or even younger if they are [589] nubile. It is very rare that a man voluntarily remains a bachelor. If someone marries late, the only reason is that he is unable to raise the bride price, i.e., the purchase price of a wife. Marriages are exogamous; there are no cases of marriage within the same clan (see p. 100). Bride stealing is unknown as a 583 685 marriage custom. If, under exceptional circumstances, it does occur it is treated as a case of common theft (No. 19, p. 358). 595 Concubinage is practiced particularly in the case when the son of a mutwale or a chief has to wait for a girl of equal rank to

suggestions there are of the effect of latter-day conceptions in superimposing themselves upon and modifying primitive law. Before going on to this, it should be added (what does not appear from the record) first, that the society of Bugufi is symbiotic, with a pastoral Tusi aristocracy, headed by a chief, dominating a semi-servile Hutu agricultural population, who largely outnumber the Tusi: secondly, that there have in Bugufi been strong forces making for change, quite apart from European administrative control. To go into these changes in detail is quite outside the scope of the present paper. It may be briefly mentioned, however, that the relative status of Tusi and Hutu is in process of rapid alteration, owing to the opportunities afforded to the Hutu under modern conditions of acquiring independent wealth, both through their labour (chiefly in Uganda) and latterly by the establishment in Bugufi of an economic crop, coffee. This change has meant maladjustment of the tribal structure. The chief sees in the economic independence of the Hutu an encroachment on his rights: and the Hutu regard the assertion of those rights as oppression. This conflict, together with the mental immaturity of the chief and the distance of the chiefdom—four days' march—from an administrative station, made it necessary for the government to establish a check in the form of a 'Native Adviser'. This system continued until early 1930, by which time an administrative station had been opened near the chief's head-quarters, and, he having shown signs of development, it was felt that an opportunity should be afforded the chief of ruling his country without the restriction of an adviser who was really a controller most of the time. These advisers, three in all, were alien to Bugufi. The first came from Bukoba, on Lake Victoria, where he later became town headman: the second was of Arab descent, having come from Urundi to live in Bugufi, where he had been settled for many years and enjoyed considerable respect: the last, a native of really fine character, who made every effort to train the chief for his work, was a Muziba from Bukoba District. All of them were charged with the dispensing of justice according to native law and custom—subject to altered concepts of crime, already imposed by the European régime, and to a general instruction to curb the oppressiveness of the chief, an instruction the interpretation of which might depend partly on the system of native law under which the adviser had been brought

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Independent of their being instruments of power, children enhanced the reputation of their fathers. The strength of a lineage and its vitality were highly valued in Ruanda. To have numerous offspring ensured that the group ancestors would be honoured, traditions maintained, and legends transmitted.

Ambition for power may be a very fitting pursuit for people who do not have to worry about fundamental human needs such as food, shelter, &c. For the Hutu, the ultimate value was security which was achieved by getting for oneself the protection of a member of the superior caste. To secure this protection, one had to become a client, and therefore to be able to supply a lord with services in labour and goods. Consequently, it was essential to produce a surplus and not only what was necessary for the subsistence of the people living in the compound. Surpluses could be obtained only by work, and children were very important in this respect. As in most peasant societies, they were useful when still quite young in helping their parents in their work. Moreover, as in the case of the Tutsi, offspring could bring supplementary protection and wealth to the compound by their ability to obtain cattle and connexions.

The preceding account might give the impression that for the Ruanda children were just means to their ultimate value of power, fame, security. This would be very misleading as they enjoyed having children simply because they liked children. This is not to question the genuineness of their affection for their offspring. I want only to stress here the social functions of children in this particular society.

Ruanda biological knowledge of the processes of procreation was extensive. They knew that a single ejaculation could produce pregnancy, that there is a relation between menstruation and fertility, that conception is not prevented during the suckling period, &c. According to their theories, the man's participation in conception was more important than the woman's. The analogy with the sowing of seeds in a field is commonly used by informants. It was pointed out to me that if it is indeed necessary for the seed to be buried in the soil, strength and vitality are unquestionably in the seed rather than in the passive ground.[10]

This last theory is important in that it gives a biological basis to the patrilineage principle of descent and to the difference between

[10] Cf. Lestrade, 1935, pp. 85-86.

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cross and parallel cousins. Lévi-Strauss's crucial assertion that parallel and cross-cousins 'from the point of view of the degree of biological proximity are strictly interchangeable',[11] would not be considered true by the Ruanda. For them any paternal cousin is *biologically* much closer than a paternal cross-cousin. The former, so to speak, originates from the same seeds as Ego, those of a common grandfather, whereas the latter comes from other seeds. This should be a relevant argument in the discussion of Lévi-Strauss's theory, since surely what matters here is not the biological conceptions of the anthropologist but those of the society which in this case differentiates parallel from cross-cousins.

Many characteristics of individuals were thought to be innate, a view coherent with the ideology of a caste society. Features were expected to be similar to those of the father (and, our informants say, this was the only way to be sure of who was the genitor). The complexion was supposed to be inherited from the mother. Psychological traits and temperament were said to come from the father, particularly in the case of his sons. Daughters were often regarded as more similar to their mothers.

The birth of a child was nearly always welcomed by a married woman, even if she were actually divorced. The only exception was in the case of twins of different sexes. This was regarded as caused by a particular intervention of Imana and as a sign of ill-luck. The diviner had to be consulted about it and often the only way to escape the evil consequences was to let one of the twins, usually the boy, die. If such a thing happened to cattle, the steer had to be killed. But a newly born baby was never unwanted. On the contrary, when it was not very clear to what group he belonged, the child was usually claimed by more than one.

The general rules were as follows: the husband was the pater of any child borne by his wife. The genitor had no right over the child even if he had been conceived in such circumstances as for instance during a very long absence of the husband in which there was no doubt about the genitor. A child borne by a divorced woman belonged to her father's inzu, though the genitor could pay a 'child-wealth' and have the child. This did not mean that he married the woman; he was redeeming the child from those who had rights in the mother's fertility. A genitor who was a married man could pay the child-wealth as well as a bachelor. If the

[11] Lévi-Strauss, 1949, p. 156.

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Servants' labour belonged completely to their masters. These servants (*abatindi* for men, *abaja* for women) were either war captives or simply very poor people (this is the first meaning of the word *abatindi*). Their payment consisted in receiving food, shelter, and clothing from their masters. Sometimes it was agreed that after a certain period of time (such as three years) the master would either pay the bride-wealth to provide the servant with a wife or would even give him his own daughter.

Family heads were the only persons who could dispose of their own labour resources, with the exception of that part required by the lord and the political authority.

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Almost any Ruanda family head could command enough rights to capital goods and labour to make his rugo self-supporting, with a certain surplus for his chief and his overlord. But these rights were not finally his. The ultimate control of the factors of production was not his. Labour, land, and cattle, in that order, were increasingly slipping away from his control. Command of the factors of production and political power was so interwoven in Ruanda social structure that they are to be analysed together in the following chapter devoted to the political organization.

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To provide the central government with regular revenues, to maintain its predominant and privileged situation, and to favour social cohesion, were the functions of the administrative structure. Moreover, as any authority in Ruanda, the land-chief was judge in the disputes concerning rights over land. The cattle-chief, however, had no judicial capacity because disputes about cattle were dealt with by the army-chief.

Impositions and taxes exist in all societies which have a centralized organization of political power. Rulers to maintain their dominant position need to be able to dispose of great revenues. The more centralized a government is, the larger is the amount of goods needed because the administrative officers are numerous.[13]

This political necessity of taxation has been justified differently according to the ideology of each culture.[14] Thus in modern democratic states, taxes are said to be the contribution of each citizen to the maintenance of services used by all members of the community, such as roads open to everybody, a police force which protects property and life against internal dangers, courts and tribunals for those who feel that they have been wronged and want to obtain reparation, an army which protects the community against an external threat, &c.

In Ruanda, tributes in labour and goods to the mwami were justified by the nature of the royal power. Kingship was divine. The first king of Ruanda, Nkuba (which means lightning), lived in heaven with his wife Nyagasani, their two sons Kigwa and Mututsi, and their daughter, Nyampundu. One day the three siblings fell from heaven and settled on a Ruanda hill. There Kigwa married his sister. Their descendents constituted the Abanyiginya clan. Mututsi, Kigwa's brother, married one of his nieces. Their descendents were the Abega. The two royal clans (usually the Abanyiginya married Abega girls) had thus a divine origin.[15] From this godlike nature of the mwami followed the justification of his absolute power and of the sovereignty of his rights over the people, the cattle, and the land of Ruanda. By virtue of that divine sovereignty, the king could require tribute. Because everything and everybody was his, he could confiscate any cattle or agricultural produce, and take the labour or even the life of anybody.

This was the theory. In fact the mwami did not use his prerogatives more than the rulers who were not divine but had the same means

[13] Maquet, 1952. [14] Maquet, 1954c, p. 63. [15] See Pagès, 1933, p. 491.

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The Ruanda military structure appears thus to have been in its warlike role an organization for conquering and looting rather than for defence. But this warlike function was not its only one and perhaps not the most important in the appreciation of many Ruanda. Whereas almost all our informants (ninety-eight per cent.) still remember the name of the army in which their inzu had been incorporated first, only a smaller proportion is able to remember certain features concerning exclusively the warlike life. Only sixty-eight per cent. still know that *abakoni* were warriors whose task was to lay hold of cattle during the battle, sixty-nine per cent. that *umudende* was a badge of honour given to those who had killed seven enemies during a campaign; just fourteen per cent. can define *impotore* as the distinction granted to those who had killed fourteen enemies and merely eleven per cent. remember that *gucana uruti* (to burn the spears) was a ceremonial to honour warriors who had killed twenty-one enemies during an expedition. This less extensive knowledge of purely warlike aspects of the army is not to be accounted for merely by the fact that one does not organize raids now and that an opportunity to kill twenty-one enemies during an expedition does not arise frequently. As the whole military structure, even in its well-remembered aspects, became obsolete at about the same time as wars, the relatively poor knowledge of its warlike features suggests that the other functions of the armies were felt to be very important.

(*b*) *Socialization*

Every society is much concerned with socializing or 'enculturalizing'[80] the younger generation. Ways of life, common abilities, values, and beliefs of the group have to be inculcated into children in order to make them efficient and conforming participants of their own culture.

In Ruanda this process of socialization was formalized for Tutsi young men. During the years they spent at the court of the king or of a chief, they were systematically given education and instruction. Education is that part of a socialization process which aims at transmitting the bulk of knowledge and behaviour expected from any well-adjusted member of a group. Young Tutsi were taught the traditional sports and dances becoming to young noblemen, they were trained in poetry and the ability to carry on an eloquent and witty conversation. The great traditions of military

[80] Herskovits, 1948, pp. 33 ff.

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traditions were transmitted. But a multiplicity of kinship group agents cannot be entrusted with a function as important for the caste as the socialization of its young members and their training in the qualities and virtues which had permitted their forbears to obtain power. Consequently, in Ruanda some formal institutes of education and instruction were set up. The *intore* companies in which every young man of the Tutsi caste spent several years, fulfilled these functions.

In order to avoid the dogma of the innate superiority of the upper layer being questioned if one of its members had to be cast out because he was unable to live up to the standards of his group, the clientage system acted as an institutionalized means of rescuing such people. It should be mentioned that the rescuer was not losing anything, as the Tutsi saved from social death could give him in return what was mainly expected from any Tutsi client: his attendance and his councils.

The tendency which leads a powerful group to constitute a closed caste, to maintain jealously its advantages, and to try to increase them, cannot be left without something to counterbalance it. Each caste, as Linton says, is a society in itself.[2] If the caste accentuates too much the characterististics which make it a socially complete group, isolated in the society of which it is only one layer, the cohesion of that society may be destroyed. Consequently, powerful factors of cohesion are needed to check the tendency towards social disintegration that exists within any caste structure. I have described solidarity factors already, but they may be summarized here.

First, there are certain groupings in which Tutsi and Hutu were to be found together. Names of the Tutsi and Hutu clans were similar. This suggested a certain solidarity among the bearers of the same clan name, however minimal it was. A comparable kind of Hutu participation existed in the armies. It is possible that the fact of having been commonly associated in dangerous circumstances gave a deeper feeling of unity to Hutu and Tutsi. The Ryangombe sect was open to Hutu and Twa as well as to Tutsi. Ryangombe himself is said to have addressed his invitation to join to every Ruanda, explicitly calling the Tutsi, the Hutu, the Twa, the men and the women.[3] As initiation ritual took place among kinsmen, however, there was no real inter-caste mingling in the

[2] Cf. Linton, 1936, pp. 130 f. [3] De Lacger, 1939, vol. I, p. 257.

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ceremonies. We may say that clan, army, and sect were 'national' only nominally and superficially. Notwithstanding, these associations between Hutu and Tutsi had probably some limited significance from the standpoint of social cohesion.

In that connexion, ***buhake*** is a much more important factor. By that agreement, almost any Hutu was linked to a Tutsi, and partook in the social power of the upper caste by identifying himself with a protector who was a member of the dominant group. He obtained for his disposal some cattle, the symbol of artistic values, and he entered into exchange relationships with the nobility. Through the clientage institution, Ruanda constituted a unified economic system which distributed agricultural and pastoral products among the totality of the population. The personal bond with a privileged caste member and access to possession, however precarious, of cattle, seem to have been essential from the point of view of national solidarity.

A third integrative factor was social mobility, even as limited as it was in Ruanda. It is certain that the number of Hutu and Twa assimilated to Tutsi because of their holding of political offices or because of their wealth, has always been tiny.

The possibility of being accepted into the superior group even if it is illusory for almost all the members of the inferior group has had in many societies a very great integrative influence. It is well known that in the United States, during the first quarter of this century, the fact that a few men among the wealthiest of the country had been born poor, greatly contributed to the psychological solace of a considerable mass of men and women who had personally no opportunity to achieve such brilliant successes. In addition to individual comfort, the belief that there was no intrinsically insuperable obstacle (such as having been born outside a closed hereditary group) helped Americans to feel that they were all members of the same nation regarded as not significantly stratified.

I do not imply that the social ascent of a few Hutu has played a similar part in Ruanda. Firstly, there was no egalitarian ideology which makes almost unbearable the fact that one is obliged by birth to live in an inferior social group; secondly, cases of inter-caste mobility were extremely rare in Ruanda. Nevertheless, these cases were a proof for Hutu that, although not belonging to the upper stratum, they were members of the Ruanda nation as well as Tutsi. They did not feel that they were out-group people.

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well as Tutsi. They did not feel that they were out-group people.

A fourth factor which counterbalanced the socially disintegrative influence of the caste system was the plurality of the structures in which any Ruanda was affiliated.

Through several structures, subjects were much more efficiently bound among themselves and to their rulers than in a unique hierarchy. In the latter case, indeed, if the individual can extricate himself from that hierarchy, he becomes absolutely unattached. In Ruanda, even if one link was broken, the subject did not escape from his superior chiefs. Indeed, he was linked to them, particularly to the mwami, by more than one tie. Almost any Ruanda was dependent on the king through two hierarchical channels: *via* his hill-chief (who himself was subordinated to the cattle- and land-chief) and *via* his army-chief. In addition, the feudal system integrated him into a set of personal loyalty relations such that the person occupying the superior position in one of these relations is himself an inferior in another relation.

It should be mentioned also that any Ruanda was a member of three kin groups: primary and secondary patrilineages and clan. Of course kinship affiliations as such did not cut across caste lines (except for the clan name), but as many of these kinship groups had been for so long established in Ruanda territory, they were certainly a supplementary link between the individual and his country.

The network of relations woven by the political and clientage systems was particularly important in a country where there were no clear-cut groupings based on co-residence. This has led some observers to believe that Ruanda were living in a kind of social vacuum. On the contrary, a Ruanda was never isolated: his social links connected him with the authorities and were ramified, if not in the whole territory, at least in a large area of it.

The last factor of social cohesion to be mentioned here was the ideology developed around the monarchic institution. The mwami was regarded as the king of all Ruanda and not only of the Tutsi. His divine origin keeping him separate from men, bestowed on him an authority which no commoner thought to question. He was closely connected with Imana, conceived as a supreme god rather remote but benevolent. The mwami, representative of Imana, was the father and protector of all Ruanda. Was it not enough to assume towards him a filial attitude and to feel one's

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dependency upon him? As in many cultures in which a king is a paternal and divine image, the Ruanda monarch certainly contributed towards the creation in Ruanda individuals of a feeling of belonging to a unit which presented some similarities to a family.

This was, it seems, how the Ruanda political and feudal structures, by their complexity, succeeded in keeping an equilibrium between, on one hand, the tendencies towards social disintegration that a caste system necessarily produces and, on the other, the minimal cohesion necessary to the maintenance of a social unit such as a nation.

(*b*) *Exploitation and protection of Hutu*

The Tutsi were confronted with the dilemma that all conquerors must solve when they settle on a new territory with the intention of staying permanently: are they going to draw upon the natural resources of the country themselves, using their own labour and equipment, and to remove from the area the aboriginal inhabitants by pushing them further on and even by exterminating them as a people, or are they to let them stay and use them by having them working for their benefit? Europeans who settled in North America adopted the first solution, they did not attempt to use Indian labour and they expelled the native population from their hunting areas and began to cultivate their country. The second method has been chosen in most parts of Africa south of the Sahara where Europeans have settled.

Whether Tutsi have explicitly considered this problem is immaterial here. In fact they have adopted the solution which was most advantageous to them. Being pastoralists and not numerous (in comparison with the Hutu peasants), they had no interest in expelling them. If this had been done, they would have had either to till the land themselves or to dispense with beer, peas, sorghum, &c. It was preferable for Tutsi to adopt what Oppenheimer calls the bee-keeper's policy (as opposed to the bear's policy who for the purpose of robbing the beehive, destroys it),[4] that is to say, to keep in the country peasants in order permanently to exploit their productive work. Those who control territory are not a dominant group; it is upon men that power is exerted.

We have seen how, through the political and feudal structures, the country's surplus resources were drained and concentrated in

[4] Oppenheimer, 1922, pp. 65 ff.

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Tutsi hands. From that point of view, we have to distinguish here two categories. In the first, we put the mwami, the court, the intermediary military and administrative chiefs, whom we call the rulers; in the second, the ordinary Tutsi. The rulers received tributes and labour through the military and administrative channels; the second got fewer consumption goods directly, but mainly labour by the *buhake*. Thus the satisfaction of the needs of the superior caste was not obtained by economic means but by social pressure.

Were these services in labour and in kind heavy for the Hutu caste? It seems that it was not a too painful obligation for about nine-tenths of the population to secure the whole of the agricultural produce of the country. But we should not forget that it was an economy based on rudimentary techniques and which did not yield a considerable surplus. Moreover, the standard of life of the dominant group was much higher than that of the inferior castes; one may thus safely assume that Tutsi consumed much more than a tenth of the total production. Such an assessment is not very precise but it does not seem possible to obtain a more accurate one.

What is certain is that the social power enjoyed collectively by the Tutsi caste was so great that it must have been a permanent temptation for them to increase their demands on the Hutu group. Such a situation was indeed at the same time both advantageous and dangerous as it carried in itself the seeds of its own destruction. For if the measures of the impositions were exceeded (and the technological and environmental circumstances made the margin very narrow), the subordinate group would be weakened and its productivity would diminish. Eventually, it might be led to leave the territory. To prevent such detrimental occurrences was all the more difficult as each Tutsi was endowed with so much individual social power that he might be inclined to misuse it.

How did the Tutsi deal with this threat? Firstly, by a universal distribution of the levies obtained through the military and administrative structures. Every familial unit of production was obliged to contribute—certainly not equally, but the mere fact of having universal impositions tended to prevent very considerable differences, because a sufficient return was secured and rules were established. These rules were not as fixed and publicized as the fiscal laws in a Western society, yet the mere fact of their existence

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564 made for certain guarantees. For the *buhake* services, what each
661 client had to give or do was less clearly determined and depended
554 more on the *shebuja*'s wishes. There were also in that sphere,
182 however, some traditionally admitted limits.

Universality and regulation of dues as such do not prevent the exactions committed by socially powerful individuals and those who required payment of taxes were powerful. Another more efficient obstacle to an exaggerated exploitation was the fact that the political and clientage structures gave to any individual of ability the opportunity to secure for himself a defender and a protector. This opportunity resulted from the plural character of the Ruanda hierarchy.

When one belongs to a single structure, there is only one immediate superior. Consequently, everything must be obtained from
[642] him and is owed to him. In a plural system, there are several immediate superiors of approximately equal rank and who are not interdependent. Consequently, it is possible to have the support of one chief (or his complicity even) when resisting another.

564 This is what happened in Ruanda. An example will show how
662 the plurality of chiefs could be used. Suppose a Hutu had in-
182 herited cattle granted by a lord to his grandfather who had also received cows from his army-chief, and who had acquired other cattle by exchange of goods (*imbata*), and because his present lord was too exacting, our Hutu wanted to change and become the client of another important man. He knew that his lord would try to seize all his *imbata* and to choose the best cows among his other cattle. By some gifts, he obtained the support of his army-chief. Before entering into discussion with his lord, he and his army-chief had agreed that all the best cows he had at his disposal and all his *imbata* would be said to have been received from the military chief. They were removed and put on grazing grounds directly protected by the army-chief. Then when the lord claimed more cows than his client wanted to return to him, he had to settle the matter not with a man of very limited power but with the army-chief.

Of course this required clever handling of the situation, but when it succeeded it secured efficient protection against extortion.

It should be added that the recourse of a subject to a higher authority within the same hierarchy was approved and even encouraged in Ruanda. This was another means of putting a check on the exorbitant demands of immediate superiors. This, however,

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did not play an important part in the feudal system because there were no socially recognized ties between a client and his lord's lord. Feudality was not a ranking system in the same sense as were the political structures. Each lord had his personal following; he was not as such the representative of a higher authority.

To sum up, the political and clientage structures at the same time secured the economic exploitation of the Hutu and protected them against an exaggerated pressure which could have led to disaster for the upper caste.

(*c*) *Delegation and centralization of political power*

Before the European occupation the kingdom's population was already numerous, probably around 1,700,000 inhabitants. The orographic configuration of the country made communications rather difficult. In that non-literate culture, an efficient collection of tributes required almost a face to face acquaintance between the subject and his ruler. These circumstances necessitated a delegation of authority to many intermediary chiefs who would be the local representatives of the rulers.

But such an unavoidable system was very dangerous for the central government. Its subordinated agents having frequently authority over a rather numerous population which could provide them with abundant supplies (if nothing was sent to the court) could be tempted to isolate themselves completely from the capital and become independent. Such a course of action would have been facilitated by the military structure and the feudal system.

Some important chiefs were, indeed, authorized to raise an army. Moreover, any military chief whose army was encamped near the border, in a district far from the capital, could gain such ascendancy over his warriors as to win over their allegiance to himself.

The *buhake* was perhaps still more dangerous because, as in any feudal system, it created personal bonds of allegiance between the client and his lord. As such, that bond of loyalty did not extend beyond the lord. One had to obey one's lord because he was one's lord and not because he was a mwami's representative. This is why any feudal system has always been so dangerous for a central government. Independence and revolt against the king have been recurring events in the areas where a feudal system existed.

Ruanda rulers were able to check successfully these tendencies

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Ruanda rulers were able to check successfully these tendencies
towards the fragmentation of the political unity of their country, first, by the ritual character of the royal power.

To revolt against the king, identified with Ruanda and supported by Imana, was a sacrilege and a profanation. It is not claimed that such a theory was sufficient to secure the kings with effective power indefinitely. Elsewhere similar ideologies of absolute and divine power of the monarchs have not prevented some of them from being stripped of their real authority, whereas their divine prerogatives were still respected. The ritual sanction does not seem to have had a primary importance in the maintenance of submission to the Ruanda kingship. In 1896 or 1897, a young mwami, Mibambwe IV Rutalindwa, was assailed and eventually lost his life in a revolt instigated by the brother of the queen-mother. That queen-mother was not the mother of the mwami but another wife of his father. Her clan, the Abega, wanted a son of hers as mwami.[8] This shows that when the king lost effective control of power, ritual sanctions were not an effective safeguard for his prerogatives, or even for his life. This is why it has not been thought necessary to expand on the ritual aspect of the Ruanda kingship. But it certainly was a factor which contributed to the obedience of the Ruanda nobles.

Another check was that the king kept at his disposal the coercive force of the armies. Even if the rebel had the support of one or two armies, the king had all the others.

But the main factor which I think prevented local authorities from asserting their independence from the central government, was the plural character of the political and feudal organization. In connexion with the maintenance of the effective power of the central government, this plurality of structure was a very effective means of maintaining misunderstanding, hostility, and jealousy among the subordinate chiefs. It is certain that the *shebuja* of our example in the preceding section, would have been only too glad to denounce to the mwami the army-chief if the latter was indulging in suspicious manœuvres. The co-existence of chiefs of almost the same rank who were constantly induced by their subjects to take sides in disputes was sufficient to create mistrust among themselves. Moreover, conflicts were numerous, particularly when two chiefs had the same territorial power (as in the case of the cattle- and land-chiefs). To settle conflicts they had to resort to the

[8] Pagès, 1933, pp. 195-206.

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superior authority's judgement and this increased the ruler's power over his subordinates.

This applied not only to the political organization but also to the feudal structure, which had potentially the most disruptive action on a centralized government. Indeed, the subject-client had often to ask protection and support from his political chief against his lord and from his lord against his political chief. Consequently, between the important lords, even those who were not themselves prominent in the political hierarchies, and the political chiefs, relations were often very tense. Moreover, as the very important lords who could have attempted to resist the central government held at the same time political offices, they were directly enmeshed in rivalries and jealousies.

Engendered by the hierarchic plurality, the mistrust which prevented the subordinate chiefs from uniting against the central government, which led them to spy on each other and to inform the king of anything suspect, was the main check against tendencies towards local autonomy in Ruanda. Even if that hostility between important Tutsi happened to express itself openly and violently, the central government was not very anxious to restore peace as long as troubles remained localized and did not threaten the regular collection of taxes and the authority of the king.

3. THE FUNCTION OF THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN RUANDA

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At the beginning of this study, in order to delimit the social phenomena we wished to study, political organization in an intragroup context was defined as 'the totality of culturally patterned relationships between certain individuals who possess the legitimate use of physical force and all the others who inhabit at a certain time a certain territory'. This definition did not include the function of a system of political relationships because, it was stated, it is only through analysis that the function fulfilled by a set of institutions in a particular social context, may be ascertained.

In the preceding chapters, the different political structures have been analysed from a functional point of view. It will be sufficient to summarize what has been said to grasp the function of the Ruanda political organization as a whole. Here we shall consider together the feudal as well as the administrative and military systems.

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ever she does, she does within the limits of her various feminine roles. However, the obligations of motherhood, of the household and of wifehood hardly prevent a woman from participating in other activities. Indeed, in Burundi, everyone is busy with politics —the large scale politics of the kingdom for the *abakuru*, the great ones, and the petty politics of daily life for the *abatoyi*, the humble folk. Women are not less interested in it than men, nor peasants less than princes. A peasant widow plays politics to obtain a length of cotton cloth or to protect against her enemies her rights to her little plot of cultivable land. A princess plays politics to obtain jewellery and cows and to decide a princely succession. A woman is sometimes driven by ambition for the sake of her son; sometimes it is to her advantage to help her husband; sometimes she enters the game entirely in her own interest. Peasant or princess, if a Rundikazi understands and desires happiness, if she knows how to dominate men in all subtlety, if she is clever and courageous, she may even defeat her own father or husband in the political game. The ambition of a Rundi or Rundikazi of inferior birth is seriously limited by the restrictive rules of the caste system. However, the ambition of a woman as such encounters only the sometimes purely apparent obstacle of a patriarchal, patrilineal system in which all the legitimate titles to wealth and power are for men.[4] Women who are ambitious and intelligent do not seem to be at a disadvantage in having to function in politics by indirect means and in secret. These are, in any case, the preferred methods of men in the delicate business of increasing power and wealth.

Thus, in Burundi as elsewhere, one finds charming but formidable matriarchs who have considerable authority and who are perhaps more intimidating than the harshest of patriarchs. On the other hand, most of the women of Burundi never even approach realization of the central values of the society. They must work to the limit of their strength so that they will not die of hunger. This is because most Rundi are of the inferior castes, where men and women share the wretchedness of the poor. It would be vain to try to calculate the difference between the misery of a man and that of a woman, if both of them are of inferior birth, without relatives or a feudal protector, old, weak and not very bright.

Neither a Rundikazi who wields great political influence nor a man of low caste who has more political power and wealth than his social superior is regarded as an outlaw. On the contrary, they are looked upon as clever and lucky. The social structure of Burundi, like that of other societies, does not describe behaviour. It only serves as a guide. A society would be crushed by the weight of

its own rules, if each infraction were punished strictly according to prescribed sanctions and if all the formal norms were always respected. To be a part of a society is to know which of its rules prescribe or prohibit absolutely or conditionally; whether a particular action which is not forbidden is nevertheless something that is simply "not done"; whether human beings, always imperfect, must in any particular case actually be punished or whether the offence should blinked. Exceptions to the formal rules are not haphazard. Rather, they are ordered by what may be called implicit norms, or secondary or functional norms. These are as well known and as well established as norms which are explicit and formal. Taken together, the explicit, primary norms and the implicit, secondary norms form the "active norms" of the society. By means of secondary norms, society can come to terms with the social and psychological impossibility of a perfect correspondence between the formal norms of the social structure, invented by men in the interest of social order, and the actions of men confronted by the empirical realities of human existence.

Each society has its own calculus of values by which it establishes its active norms, the norms to be respected verbally but understood to be neither practical nor practised, and the rules of punishment which are to be taken seriously. It will not be possible to understand the life of the women of Burundi without knowing both the formal norms of the social structure and the secondary, functional norms. The life of a Rundikazi is made up of various elements. To reconstruct it, we shall begin with a description of women as members of Rundi society, of which they form an integral part. We shall then describe women in the specifically feminine roles, and we shall conclude with an account of the devices used by women to realize the values of their patriarchal society.

* * *

The Rundi describe their society as a hierarchy ordered by *Imana*, the Supreme Being, who is at its summit. Among human beings, it is the *mwami*, the king, who is superior to all. In the past, there was also Kiranga, the legendary head of a possession cult. He was said to be of approximately the same rank as the *mwami*.[5] Immediately below the king are the *baganwa*, the princes—four generations of the descendents of a king. The *mwami* and the *baganwa* are the rulers of the Rundi. In the traditional system, the power of the *mwami* was defined by his inheritence of absolute royal power and of the entire country, together with all its goods,